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TOWARDS A NEW LENS OF ANALYSIS: 
THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS 
TO CHILD NEGLECT STATUTES 
 
Gregory Engle* 
I.INTRODUCTION 
Every year, many children die of afflictions that are, at their core, 
completely treatable.  They are allowed to succumb to these diseases and 
conditions—some as benign as a curable intestinal blockage1—solely 
because their parents subscribe to a religion that forbids them from visiting 
a doctor or seeking treatment at a hospital.  Instead, they seek spiritual 
treatment through prayer and ritual.  This is arguably within the liberty 
interests of adults, but when children are involved, the situation is much 
more complicated. 
Every state has enacted statutes to prevent child abuse.  In Virginia, for 
instance, “[a]ny parent, [or] guardian,... who by willful act or omission or 
refusal to provide any necessary care for the child’s health causes or permits 
serious injury to the life or health of such child shall be guilty of a Class 4 
felony.”2  In addition to preventing active abuse, this statute is notable for 
criminalizing inaction.  The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act 
federally mandated these statutes in 1974,3 along with a requirement that an 
exemption for religious belief be included.  Though the requirement for 
exemption has since been lifted, many states still have them in force.4  It is 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2011, University of Richmond School of Law; B.A., 2008, University of Notre Dame.  
The author thanks Professor Kevin Walsh for his guidance in the preparation of this piece.  Thanks also 
go to his parents John and Shelley, and his fiancee, Jamie Grebowski, for their patience and support 
throughout his legal education. 
1. See SHAWN FRANCIS PETERS, WHEN PRAYER FAILS: FAITH HEALING, CHILDREN, AND THE LAW 177-
78 (2008).  The child, 13-year-old Sandra Kay Arnold, could have been saved by a simple surgery up to 
twelve hours before her death. Id. 
2. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-371.1(A). 
3. The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (codified as 
amended at 42 §§ 5101-5119c (2003)). 
4. Child Abuse and Neglect Prevention Treatment Program, 45 C.F.R. § 1340.2 (1983). 
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largely these exemptions that allow for children to die without ever seeing a 
doctor. 
The exemptions are roundly criticized, and these criticisms are often 
couched in Establishment Clause jurisprudence.  This clause prohibits the 
government from awarding precedence, favor, and legal exemption to 
certain religious groups.5  This criticism is a strong one, but has flaws.  A 
better way of looking at these exemptions is through the lens of the Equal 
Protection Clause.6  Simply put, exemptions create one class of children 
who are not awarded the same legal protections as another class, violating 
their constitutional rights and endangering their lives. 
In order to analyze the religious exemptions, this paper will begin with 
their history.  Part II looks at the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment 
Act of 1974 (CAPTA) the statute that precipitated their spread, as well as 
the justifications that it was bolstered upon: Free Exercise of religion and 
parental rights.  The Equal Protection critique follows as Part III, followed 
by Part IV that discusses the traditional critique, grounded in the 
Establishment Clause.  In Part V, the article will finish with an explanation 
of why the Equal Protection critique is a much stronger criticism. 
 
II. THE HISTORY OF AND JUSTIFICATIONS FOR EXEMPTIONS 
A. CAPTA and Its Aftermath 
In 1974, Congress confronted the inconsistent standards of child abuse 
and neglect statutes across the country by unifying them into one national 
standard; this was accomplished through CAPTA.7  The Act did not contain 
specific exemptions for religious purposes, but was rather left to the 
judgment of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW).8  
Now known as the Department of Health and Human Services, the agency 
“interpreted [the act] as requiring an exemption from child neglect liability 
for parents who treated their children by faith healing. Thus, HEW required 
the states to adopt religious exemptions before they could receive federal 
 
5. U.S. CONST. amend I. 
6. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. 
7. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, supra note 3. 
8. J. T. Gathings, When Rights Clash: The Conflict Between a Parent’s Right to Free Exercise of 
Religion Versus His Child’s Right to Life, 19 CUMB. L. REV. 585, 591 (1989). 
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funding for state child-protection programs.”9  The states followed suit 
accordingly, enshrining in their various codes language such as the 
following: “[A] minor child who in good faith is under treatment solely by 
spiritual means through prayer in accordance with the tenets and practices 
of a recognized church or religious denomination shall not for that reason 
alone be considered [an abused or neglected child].”10 
Since the 1974 regulation, the Department has changed its position 
drastically.  In 1983, new regulations were adopted, striking down the 
exemption requirement: “nothing in the federal rule should be construed as 
requiring or prohibiting a finding of neglect when a parent practicing his or 
her religious beliefs does not, on that basis alone, provide medical treatment 
for his or her child.”11  Four years later, a regulation was promulgated that 
clarified even further: 
Previous regulations for this program required that State statutes contain a 
provision that, when parents or guardians provide spiritual or other forms of 
remedial health care, they should not, for that reason alone, be considered 
negligent parents. This requirement was deleted in the final rules published 
January 26, 1983.  [S]uch an eligibility requirement was not required by the 
Act and thus should not be imposed by Federal regulation.12 
It would seem as though this language is relatively straightforward and 
would pave the way for repeal of these exemptions.  Conventional wisdom  
 
 
 
 
 
9. Id.; see Child Abuse and Neglect Prevention and Treatment Program, 45 Fed. Reg. 43,936, 43,937 
(Dec. 19, 1974) (“a parent or guardian legitimately practicing his religious beliefs who thereby does not 
provide specified medical treatment for a child, for that reason alone shall not be considered a negligent 
parent or guardian . . . .”). 
10. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-371.1(C) (2001); see Rita Swan, On Statutes Depriving a Class of Children 
of Rights to Medical Care: Can This Discrimination Be Litigated?, 2 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 73, 81 
nn.47–48 (1998) (listing many other statutes). 
11. Paula A. Monopoli, Allocating the Costs of Parental Free Exercise: Striking a New Balance 
Between Sincere Religious Belief and a Child’s Right to Medical Treatment, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 319, 332 
(1991).  See Child Abuse and Neglect Prevention and Treatment Program, 45 C.F.R. § 1340.2(d)(3)(ii) 
(1983) (“[N]othing in this part should be construed as requiring or prohibiting a finding of negligent 
treatment or maltreatment when a parent practicing his or her religious beliefs does not, for that reason 
alone, provide medical treatment for a child . . . .”). 
12. Child Abuse and Neglect Prevention and Treatment Program, 52 Fed. Reg. 3990, 3993 (Feb. 6, 
1987) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 40). 
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says, however, that once in place, laws are very hard to repeal.13  As such, 
only a handful of states have amended their statutes, including Colorado, 
Oklahoma, and South Dakota.14 
B. Justifying Exemptions 
1. Free Exercise 
The primary motivation for these exemptions is grounded in the Free 
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.  “Congress shall make no 
law...prohibiting the free exercise [of religion].”15  A compelling argument 
and reasoning for this protection is rooted in the writings of the so-called 
“Father of the Constitution,”16 James Madison.  In his famous Memorial 
and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, Madison wrote: 
The Religion then of every man must be left to the conviction and conscience 
of every man.... Whilst we assert for ourselves a freedom to embrace, to profess 
and to observe the Religion which we believe to be of divine origin, we cannot 
deny an equal freedom to those whose minds have not yet yielded to the 
evidence which has convinced us.17 
The question of free exercise and exemptions is relatively settled vis-à-
vis competent adults.  Given “the fundamental premise that everyone has 
the inherent right to control their own person,”18 it is readily accepted that 
 
13. Some argue that the Christian Science Church, a strong faith-healing sect, has a near-unlimited 
lobbying arm, which exerts significant pressure on the legislature and helps keep these protections in 
place.  See Kei Robert Hirasawa, Note, Are Parents Acting In the Best Interests of Their Children When 
They Make Medical Decisions Based on Their Religious Beliefs?, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 316, 318 n.31 
(2006) (“[T]he Christian Science Church . . .  maintain[s] a salaried lobbyist in every state and 
besieg[es] legislators with letters, calls, and visits from church members.”); Scott St. Amand, Protecting 
Neglect: The Constitutionality of Spiritual Healing Exemptions to Child Neglect Statutes, 12 RICH. J. L. 
& PUB. INT. 139, 147 (2009) (observing “lobbying by the coordinate mass of Christian Scientists”); 
Allison Ciullo, Note, Prosecution Without Persecution: The Inability of Courts to Recognize Christian 
Science Spiritual Healing and a Shift Towards Legislative Action, 42 NEW ENG. L. REV. 155, 170 
(2007) (“[E]xemptions are often the result of extensive lobbying campaigns and debates by politically 
active Christian Scientists.”). 
14. COLO. REV. STAT. § 193-103(1) (2008); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 852(C) (2002 & Supp. 2009); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 26-10-1.1 (Supp. 1990). 
15. U.S. CONST. amend. 1. 
16. See About The White House, Presidents: James Madison,  
http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents/jamesmadison (last visited December 4, 2009) (“[i]n later 
years, . . . he was referred to as the ‘Father of the Constitution.’”). 
17. David E. Steinberg, Children and Spiritual Healing: Having Faith in Free Exercise, 76 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 179, 190 (2000) (citing 2 JAMES MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance Against 
Religion Assessments, in THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183, 184, 186 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901)). 
18. Julie E. Koehne, Comment, Witnesses on Trial: Judicial Intrusion Upon the Practices of Jehovah’s 
Witness Parents, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 205, 208 (1993) (citing In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 
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“a competent individual has a constitutionally protected right to refuse 
medical treatment regardless of his or her medical condition”19 – a right that 
is not changed if religion is involved. 
In the American spectrum of religions, some sects rely solely upon 
prayer to heal medical needs.  A major example is that of the Church of 
Christ, Scientist, commonly known as the Christian Science church.  The 
church was founded in the late nineteenth century, and teaches that 
“diseases and sickness are manifestations of the mind that can be overcome 
only by praying and drawing closer to God.”20  Specific healing counselors 
are appointed and trained in the church’s way, and are called upon to 
provide assistance in medical emergencies.21  Believers argue that in order 
to fully practice their religion, they must not be forced to take their children 
to doctors.22 
The Jehovah’s Witnesses are in a similar situation.  Founded in 1876,23 
the Witnesses do not have an outright ban on medical care or visits to 
doctors and hospitals, but they do “generally refuse to take blood 
transfusions even when these are judged by physicians to be absolutely 
necessary for the preservation of life and health.”24  This refusal is “based 
upon what they believe to be the Bible’s prohibition against ‘eating 
blood.’”25  They remain committed to this belief despite any outsiders’ 
arguments.26  Again, followers argue that if they were required to take their 
children to doctors or hospitals, and their conditions necessitated a blood 
transfusion – an increasingly common procedure for any number of 
afflictions – it would interfere with their ability to fully practice their 
religion.27 
 
 
So.2d 4, 10 (Fla. 1990)). 
19. Id. 
20. Elizabeth Lingle, Treating Children by Faith: Colliding Constitutional Issues, 17 J. LEGAL MED 
301, 306. 
21. See Comment, Commonwealth v. Twitchell: Who Owns the Child? 7 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & 
POL’Y 413, 423 (1991). 
22. See Lingle, supra note 20, at 306. 
23. Koehne, supra note 18, at 207. 
24. John C. Ford, Refusal of Blood Transfusions by Jehovah’s Witnesses, 10 CATH. LAW. 212, 212 
(1964). 
25. Koehne, supra note 18, at 207 & n.14 (citing various biblical provisions relied upon by Witnesses). 
26. See Ford, supra note 26, at 212 (“If it is objected that this was a dietary law, having nothing to do 
with the medical use of blood, they reply that a transfusion is the equivalent of eating; it is intravenous 
feeding.”). 
27. See id. at 215. 
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In addition to these two major sects with religiously based aversion to 
doctors, numerous fringe groups exist.  One example is the Followers of 
Christ Church, located in Oregon City, Oregon.28  This church has created a 
small uproar in its community for over a decade.29  In 1998, the state’s 
medical examiner alleged that “the faith-healing congregation’s avoidance 
of doctors and hospitals may have cost the lives of 25 children, some under 
excruciating circumstances.”30  In the decade since, there have been more 
deaths, including 15-month-old Ava Worthington, who died in 2008 of 
bacterial pneumonia and a blood infection.31  These conditions were 
treatable, but her family merely prayed for her recovery, “never [seeking] 
medical treatment or call[ing] 9-1-1, not even when [the child] stopped 
breathing.”32  This led to the conviction of her father for second-degree 
criminal mistreatment in the summer of 2009, with another family to face 
trial in January 2010.33 
Another church is the Unleavened Bread Ministries, based mostly on the 
Internet.34  This church came under scrutiny for the death of 11-year-old 
Madeline Kara Neumann, who died on Easter Sunday of 2008 of untreated 
diabetes, a common and manageable condition.35  Her parents were 
convicted of second-degree reckless homicide in August, 2009, and “were 
ordered to spend 30 days in jail each year for the next six years and were 
placed on 10 years’ probation.”36  These small churches, some with no more  
 
 
 
28. Jonathan Turley, When a Child Dies, Faith is No Defense, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2009, at B1. 
29. See id. 
30. Steinberg, supra note 17, at 179–80 (quoting David Van Biema, Faith or Healing? Why the Law 
Can’t Do a Thing About the Infant-Mortality Rate of an Oregon Sect, TIME, (Aug. 31, 1998) at 68). 
31. Turley, supra note 28 at B1. 
32. Steve Mayes, Jurors’ Empathy Led to ‘Epiphany’, OREGONIAN (Portland, Or.) July 24, 2009. 
33. See Rick Bella, Faith Healer Gets Jail Time, OREGONIAN (Portland, Or.), August 1, 2009. 
34. Scott St. Amand, supra note 13, at 139–40.  This church teaches: 
We are not commanded in scripture to send people to the doctor but to meet their needs 
through prayer and faith . . . . [W]e are not against doctors for those who have their faith 
there and never condemn or restrict them in any way.  But we know that the best one to 
trust in for healing is Jesus Christ.  
Press Release, David Ellis, Press Release from Unleavened Bread Ministries Regarding the Death of 11 
Year-Old Madeline Kara Neumann (Mar. 27, 2008), available at  
http://www.wsaw.com/news/misc/17059725.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2010).  See generally 
Unleavened Bread Ministries, http://www.unleavenedbreadministries.org (last visited Dec. 4, 2009). 
35. Emma Graves Fitzsimmons, Wisconsin Couple Sentenced In Death of Their Sick Child, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 8, 2009, at A16. 
36. Id. 
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than two hundred members, do not have the same prominence or notoriety 
as the larger sects, but nevertheless argue for their own religious freedoms 
and for the protections mandated by the Constitution.37 
2. Parental Rights 
Notwithstanding any Free Exercise concerns that may necessitate a 
religious exemption, many also rely upon secular “parental rights” to 
support exemptions.  Though not grounded in one specific statute or 
religious tenet, courts have long established that parents have the right to 
raise their children to meet their particular family’s habits and mores. 
a. Education 
The most common example of parental rights is in the field of education.  
A 1925 case, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, established the rights of parents to 
send their children to a private school.38  An Oregon law was passed, the 
Compulsory Education Act, “requir[ing] every parent... of a child between 
eight and sixteen years to send him ‘to a public school...in the district where 
the child resides.”39  The Society of Sisters operated a Roman Catholic 
school that would necessarily be harmed by the enforcement of this act, and 
so sued to enjoin its provisions.40  The Supreme Court found, in a 
unanimous opinion, that “the Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the 
liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of 
under their control.”41  Offering a strong endorsement of parental rights, the 
Court explained that “the child is not the mere creature of the State; those 
who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high 
duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.”42  The statute 
was thus ruled unconstitutional. 
Many years later, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court again addressed the 
question of parental rights with regard to education.43  The Old Order 
Amish believe in a separatist and traditional way of life, eschewing most 
interactions with modern society.44  As such, they elect to keep their 
 
37. Lingle, supra note 20, at 309. 
38. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925). 
39. Id. at 530. 
40. Id. at 532. 
41. Id. at 534–35. 
42. Id. at 535. 
43. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972). 
44. Id. at 210. 
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children home from school once they have learned basic fundamentals – 
typically after eighth grade.45  Wisconsin, however, had a statute mandating 
school attendance until the age of sixteen, and three families were convicted 
of violating this statute for keeping their children home.46 
After acknowledging the precedent of Pierce, the Court took a “hybrid 
rights” theory and held that “when the interests of parenthood are combined 
with a free exercise claim of the nature revealed by this record, more than 
merely a ‘reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the 
State’ is required to sustain the validity of the State’s requirement under the 
First Amendment.”47  The State has an interest in setting standards for 
education, and for ensuring that children reach these standards, but the 
Amish parents successfully convinced the Court that their upbringing 
outside of conventional schooling was sufficient to fill the gap.48  The 
parental rights coupled with the right to free exercise to carry the day for the 
Amish.  Thus a precedent was born, giving grounds for the argument that 
hybrid rights should be more protected than singular rights. 
b. Safety and Health 
The parental rights doctrine, even when coupled with a religious right, 
isn’t necessarily ironclad.  This was evidenced by Prince v. 
Massachusetts.49  Massachusetts had a child labor law that, in part, forbade 
a child from “sell[ing], expos[ing] or offer[ing] for sale any newspapers, 
magazines, periodicals or any other articles of merchandise of any 
description...in any street or public place.”50  The onus for this law was put 
largely on the parents and legal guardians, as it was to them that 
punishment would be dealt.51  Sarah Prince, a Jehovah’s Witness, took her 
young ward into the streets to pass out evangelical literature promoting the 
Witnesses.52  She was confronted by a truancy officer, and later convicted 
 
45. Id. at 210–11. 
46. Interestingly, their fine was a paltry five dollars, possibly but in context might have meant much 
more. See JAY WEXLER, Amish Agitation: Destination the Cheese State, in HOLY HULLABALOOS, 59, 
64–84 (2009), for a humorous and personable account of Yoder, the Old Order Amish, and the 
Wisconsin town of New Glarus eighty years after the fact. 
47. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233. 
48. Id. at 235 (“[The Amish] have carried the even more difficult burden of demonstrating the adequacy 
of their alternative mode of continuing informal vocational education in terms of precisely those overall 
interests that the State advances in support of its program of compulsory high school education.”). 
49. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
50. Id. at 160–61 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 69 (1944)). 
51. Id. at 161 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 81 (1944)). 
52. Id. at 159–61. 
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of violating the labor statute.53  Appealing her conviction, Ms. Prince 
argued that her right to free expression, taken in conjunction with her right 
to bring up the child as she saw fit, gave the state no grounds to interfere.54 
The state’s interest here was not educational but protective, for “an 
obvious purpose of the statute was to keep children out of [the] potentially 
dangerous situation[ ]” of vending at night.55  As in Yoder, Ms. Prince 
argued a hybrid rights theory, but her cause was unsuccessful.56  The Court 
found that “[p]arents may be free to become martyrs themselves.  But it 
does not follow that they are free, in identical circumstances, to make 
martyrs of their children before they have reached the age of full and legal 
discretion when they can make that choice for themselves.”57  Despite the 
slightly hyperbolic language, the point resounds that when public safety is 
an issue, the state has a right to limit parental rights in order to promote “the 
healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as 
citizens.”58 
The District Court of Washington took on a similar issue in Jehovah’s 
Witnesses v. King County, building upon Prince’s framework vis-à-vis 
medical issues.59  In King County, three religious groups brought a 
challenge to a Washington state statute authorizing courts to take custody of 
children if their parents refused blood transfusions.60  In particular, a boy 
named Jeffrey Elam was injured in an automobile accident.61  The attending 
doctors petitioned a court for an order authorizing custody of the boy to the 
State and for a transfusion procedure if necessary.62  The court looked to 
Prince for guidance, reiterating the statement that parents may not “make 
martyrs of their children.”63  While making an important distinction by 
explaining that “[i]t is true that in Prince, the [Supreme C]ourt made it clear 
that it did not intend that opinion to lay the foundation for every state 
intervention in the indoctrination and participation of children in religion 
which may be done in the name of their health and welfare,” the district 
 
53. Id. at 162–63. 
54. Id. at 164. 
55. James G. Dwyer, Parents’ Religion and Children’s Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of Parents’ 
Rights, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1371, 1380 (1994) [hereinafter Dwyer I]. 
56. Prince, 321 U.S. at 170. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 168. 
59. Jehovah’s Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967). 
60. Id. at 491. 
61. Id. at 497. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 504 (quoting Prince, 321 U.S. at 170). 
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court held “on the compelling authority of Prince” that the statutes were 
constitutional. 64  The Supreme Court affirmed the decision, approving the 
district court’s conclusion.65  Taken together, these cases create a boundary 
for parental rights: a parent’s choices may not “endanger seriously a child’s 
physical health or safety.”66 
III. WHAT’S WRONG WITH EXEMPTIONS 
A. Equal Protection, Generally 
Religious exemptions are built on the back of the Free Exercise Clause, 
and, primarily, attacked through the Establishment Clause.67  Yet beyond 
this First Amendment-based back-and-forth exists a different approach of 
analyzing the exemptions.  This approach, based upon the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s guarantee of Equal Protection, argues that religious 
exemptions unconstitutionally create two classes of children: one class 
protected from neglect, and one unprotected.68 
The Fourteenth Amendment holds, in part, “[n]o State shall... deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”69  The 
Equal Protection Clause has become well known as the major player in 
race-based decisions and the country’s gradual move towards racial 
integration.  For example, it was under the auspices of Equal Protection that 
Brown v. Board of Education was decided, striking down segregated 
schools and opening the floodgates to desegregation in all facets of life.70 
Establishment Clause questions often depend upon the three prongs of 
the so-called “Lemon Test,” requiring an investigation of its purpose, effect, 
and entanglement,71 Equal Protection analysis usually turns on the 
determination of levels of scrutiny.  This determination is the method by 
which a court decides which test should be applied to a challenge.72 In the 
 
64. Id. at 504–05 (emphasis added). 
65. Id., cert. denied, 390 U.S. 598 (1968). 
66. Dwyer I, supra note 55, at 1382. 
67. See infra Part IV. 
68. Rita Swan, On Statute Depriving a Class of Children of Rights to Medical Care: Can This 
Discrimination be Litigated?, 2 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 73, 93–95 (1998). 
69. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
70. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
71. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
72. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLE S AND POLICIES 539 (3d ed. 2006). 
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words of Professor Erwin Chemerinsky, one of the foremost scholars of the 
Constitution, “[i]n constitutional litigation concerning individuals’ rights 
and equal protection the outcome often very much depends on the ‘level of 
scrutiny’ used.  The level of scrutiny is the test that is applied to determine 
if the law is constitutional.”73 There are three different types of analysis: 
rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny.74  The rational basis 
test is the least demanding test, and “is the minimum level of scrutiny that 
all laws challenged under equal protection must meet.”75  The plaintiff in 
these cases bears the burden of proof, and the challenged law “will be 
upheld if it is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.”76  
Statutes are rarely overturned under this standard, for “[t]he rational basis 
test is enormously deferential to the government.”77 
On the other end of the spectrum, the test is most severe under a strict 
scrutiny analysis.78  In order for a statute to survive strict scrutiny analysis, 
“the court must regard the government’s purpose as vital, as ‘compelling.’79  
Also, the law must be shown to be ‘necessary’ as a means to accomplishing 
the end.”80  The burden is shifted to the state, and “laws generally are 
declared unconstitutional when it is applied.”81  Interestingly, strict scrutiny 
analysis can trace its origin largely to a mere footnote in an otherwise-
inconsequential case, United States v. Carolene Products.82  At the time, 
rational basis review was essentially the only standard for Equal Protection 
analysis, and the multi-tiered approach was not yet fully realized.  Justice 
Stone, writing for the Court, pondered whether there existed situations 
“which may call for a... more searching judicial inquiry.”83  These situations 
would be those contemplating “prejudice against discrete and insular 
minorities... which tend[] seriously to curtail the operation of those political 
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities.”84 
 
73. See id. 
74. See id. at 540-42. 
75. Id. at 672. 
76. Id. (emphasis added). 
77. Id.  Of course, a finding of unconstitutionality is not impossible under the “Rational basis” test.  In 
fact, some argue that religious exemptions are unable to satisfy even this low scrutiny, for “they in fact 
thwart the purpose of the abuse and neglect statues because they result in certain children being deprived 
of the kind of medical treatment necessary to preserve their lives.”  Monopoli, supra note 11, at 349. 
78. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 72, at 542. 
79. Id. at 541. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. at 542. 
82. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
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Since strict scrutiny analysis is typically reserved for racial minorities 
(those “discrete and insular minorities”85 of Justice Stone’s phrasing), there 
exists a gap where those groups who may not qualify for strict scrutiny yet 
still merit increased protection may fall.  For example, discrimination based 
on gender is usually placed in this middle category.86  For this reason, there 
exists an “intermediate” level of scrutiny to serve as a catchall.  
Intermediate scrutiny is slightly more amorphous, and often is divided in 
two levels itself.  The higher level “requires the state to demonstrate that its 
action is substantially related to a state interest that is both legitimate and 
“important.’”87  The lower intermediate level “requires the state to 
demonstrate that its action is substantially related to a merely legitimate 
state interest.”88 
The determination of whether a group merits strict scrutiny is incredibly 
important, and thus far, the Supreme Court has declined to extend strict 
scrutiny to groups based on age.89  This would seem to indicate that 
children would not merit this heightened level of protection.  Some 
scholars, however, make a strong case for granting this protection; one such 
scholar is Professor James Dwyer.  His approach is worthy of a full 
discussion, for it could serve as a strong tactic for challenging exemptions. 
B. Equal Protection, Applied: Prof. Dwyer’s Approach 
There is a traditional understanding in American jurisprudence that 
children are, in addition to being subjects of their parents,90 also subject to 
the protection of the state through the concept of “parens patriae.”  From 
the Latin for “parent of the country,”91 this concept “permits the state to 
intervene in parental decision-making potentially harmful to a minor 
child.”92  When rights are balanced in juvenile issues, therefore, the balance 
 
85. Id. 
86. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 72, at 541 (“[I]ntermediate scrutiny is used in evaluating laws involving 
gender discrimination.”). 
87. James G. Dwyer, The Children We Abandon: Religious Exemptions to Child Welfare and Education 
Laws as Denials of Equal Protection to Children of Religious Objectors, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1321, 1391 
(1996) [hereinafter Dwyer II] (citation omitted). 
88. Id. at 1392 (citation omitted). 
89. Ann Massie, The Religion Clauses and Parental Health Care Decisionmaking for Children: 
Suggestions for a New Approach, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 725, 731 & n.22 (1994) (“[C]lassifications 
based on gender or illegitimacy receive a heightened review that is less than strict scrutiny.  The 
Supreme Court has refused to extend heightened scrutiny to classifications based on wealth or age.”). 
90. This is subject to some limitations; see supra Part II.B. 
91. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 520 (3d Pocket ed. 1996). 
92. Massie, supra note 89, at 742. 
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is between the parent’s interest and the state’s, acting as parens patriae.  
Professor Dwyer has criticized this approach for leaving out the rights of 
the children and violating “the moral precept that no individual is entitled to 
control the life of another person, free from outside interference, no matter 
how intimate the relationship between them.”93  This is especially true, 
Dwyer insists, when the control goes against the person’s “temporal 
interests” – ostensibly including medical decisions.94  He even criticizes 
court decisions that have ruled in favor of protecting children, for while 
“societal interests in the welfare of children have often been found 
sufficiently compelling to trump parental free exercise claims[,]... courts 
have continued to ignore or minimize the rights and interests of the children 
themselves.”95 
This makes logical sense, “while competent individuals may justly suffer 
as a result of their own choices, no one should suffer avoidable harm 
because of circumstances beyond their control, and particularly not as a 
result of other people’s choices.”96  So how does this principle factor into 
Equal Protection analysis?  It ties directly into the level-of-scrutiny 
analysis.  Using the argument that the rights of the children have been 
systematically ignored, Dwyer reasons that “children of religious objectors 
satisfy all of the criteria for designation as a suspect or quasi-suspect 
class....  [L]egislation that denies them benefits accorded other children 
should be subject to exacting judicial scrutiny.”97  In particular, he defines 
four factors that courts use to define a suspect class: whether the class’s 
characteristics could ever be a valid state interest; whether a history of 
intentional discrimination is present; the class’s ability to have political 
clout; and whether the defining characteristic is immutable.98  Taking the 
characteristic of a parent’s religious preference through these steps, Dwyer 
concludes that strict scrutiny is an appropriate lens through which to 
evaluate children’s issues.  The first three he views as somewhat self-
explanatory, for “like race, the religion of one’s parents bears no inherent 
relation to one’s native ability to benefit”99 from society, while children are 
clearly unable to change their parents’ religion (immutability) nor have any 
sway politically.  Meanwhile, although children do not face “hostility 
 
93. Dwyer I, supra note 55, at 1373. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 1389. 
96. Dwyer II, supra note 87, at 1372. 
97. Id. at 1412. 
98. Id. at 1396. 
99. Id. at 1397. 
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toward them on the part of the majority,” there is demonstrated “substantial 
indifference” towards children in these households.100  “Legislation that 
denies [some children] benefits accorded other children,” he concludes, 
“should be subject to exacting judicial scrutiny.”101 
Professor Zaven Saroyan offers another argument for strict scrutiny 
analysis.102  He looks back to the precedents of Yoder103 and Employment 
Division v. Smith104 and the development of “hybrid rights” cases.  These 
cases, succinctly defined, concern multiple fundamental rights.105 Saroyan 
concludes that “courts must consider spiritual healing challenges as hybrid 
cases,” for they concern both the parent’s religious right and the child’s 
right to well-being.106  Since a case of this nature typically merits strict 
scrutiny, he argues, a spiritual healing challenge should be treated no 
differently.107  Under such a test, “the court will be able to reach a result in 
which the child’s fundamental right to life, inarguably the most important 
right in the present matter, will be protected, while still allowing a parent 
the rights of free exercise and parenthood.”108 
Whether through hybrid rights or straightforward suspect class 
designation, the argument for strict scrutiny, and Equal Protection 
generally, is a compelling one.  The best way to understand the argument is 
through analogy, and two strong illustrations are cases involving 
illegitimate children and incompetent adults. 
1. Illegitimate Children 
Long ago, children of unmarried partners were viewed with disfavor and 
disdain.  In addition to being social outcasts, there were legal barriers in 
place.  One such restriction was on child support: so-called “illegitimate 
children” were denied a judicially-enforceable guarantee of child support 
 
100. Id. at 1412. 
101. Id. 
102. Zaven T. Saroyan, Spiritual Healing and the Free Exercise Clause: An Argument for the Use of 
Strict Scrutiny, 12 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 363 (2002). 
103. See supra Part II.B.2. 
104. Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (upholding the State’s right to prohibit 
certain drug use, such as peyote, over religious objection). 
105. Id. at 881 (“The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars application 
of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise 
Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections.”). 
106. Saroyan, supra note 102. 
107. See id. at 382–85 (analyzing why strict scrutiny applies to hybrid rights cases). 
108. Id. at 385. 
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that children born in wedlock were awarded.109  In 1973, the Supreme Court 
held that this sort of discrimination was unconstitutional in the case of 
Gomez v. Perez.110  Texas had a statute that codified old common-law 
precedent: “illegitimate children... have no legal right to support from their 
fathers.”111 Further, a father “may set up illegitimacy as a defense” as a 
means of avoiding payment.112  As the child would be guaranteed monetary 
support but for the unmarried status of its parents, a fact conceded by the 
state, an equal protection challenge was taken up by the Supreme Court.113  
Looking largely to precedent guaranteeing wrongful death claims despite a 
finding of illegitimacy,114 the Court made the straightforward 
pronouncement that “a State may not invidiously discriminate against 
illegitimate children by denying them substantial benefits accorded children 
generally.”115 As such, “once a State posits a judicially enforceable right on 
behalf of children to needed support from their natural fathers there is no 
constitutionally sufficient justification for denying such an essential right to 
a child simply because its natural father has not married its mother.”116 
Similarly, children born out of wedlock were for many years denied 
equal recovery rights in worker’s compensation actions.117  Instead of being 
guaranteed support, these children were relegated to an “other dependents” 
status and were only allowed recovery “if there are not enough surviving 
dependents... [as] to exhaust the maximum allowable benefits.”118  In the 
1972 case of Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, the 
constitutionality of these denials was evaluated.119 The court applied a 
rational basis test, yet still overturned the statute. 120  The state has a strong 
interest in supporting what was termed “legitimate family relationships,” 
yet the Court held that this interest was “not served by the statute.”121 
 
109. Dwyer II, supra note 87 at 1368. 
110. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973). 
111. Id. at 537. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
114. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). 
115. Gomez, 409 U.S. at 538. 
116. Id.;  see Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1 (1983) (finding that a two-year statute of limitations on child 
support enforced against illegitimate children, yet inapplicable to children born of a marriage, is 
similarly unconstitutional). 
117. Monopoli, supra note 11, at 348 n.189. 
118. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 168 (1972). 
119. Id. 
120. Id. at 172 (“[T]his Court requires, at a minimum, that a statutory classification bear some rational 
relationship to a legitimate state purpose.”). 
121. Id. at 175. 
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The Court went on to discuss the illegitimate children’s needs directly.  
Though tacitly condoning some societal scorn on the practice of having 
children outside of marriage,122 the Court strongly stated that “visiting this 
condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust.”123  The 
opinion continued: 
 
[I]mposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept 
of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual 
responsibility or wrongdoing.  Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth 
and penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffectual [and] unjust [] way of 
deterring the parent....124 
Reasoning that the statute addressed no legitimate state purpose, the 
Court found it unconstitutional.125  Through Weber and Gomez, the Court 
upheld the notion that an Equal Protection violation exists when two classes 
of children are treated differently solely because they were born into 
different families. 
2. Incompetent Adults 
A conflict between religious beliefs and medical decisions often arises 
when adults are incapacitated due to an accident or other sudden event and 
do not leave behind a living will or other directive.  The Supreme Court of 
New Jersey grappled with this question in 1976 while handling the matter 
of In re Quinlan.126  Karen Quinlan collapsed and stopped breathing for 
upwards of a half hour;127 she was resuscitated but could only breathe on a 
ventilator; her brain functions were impaired.128  Karen was analyzed by a 
number of medical professionals, who ultimately determined that she was 
“in a chronic and persistent ‘vegetative’ state, having no awareness of 
anything or anyone around her and existing at a primitive reflex level.”129 
After consulting their priest, Karen’s parents made the decision to 
remove Karen’s ventilator and allow her to have the “natural death” 
 
122. Id. at 175 (“The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages society’s condemnation of 
irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage.”). 
123. Id. 
124. Id. at 175–76. 
125. Id. 
126. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976). 
127. Id. at 653–54. 
128. Id. at 655. 
129. Id. 
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consistent with their Catholic faith.130  The hospital demurred, as the 
doctors involved were unwilling to contribute to the ending of her life.131  
Although the court found that the parents did have the right to remove 
Karen’s ventilator,132 it did not base this finding on the Quinlan’s religious 
beliefs.  In fact, the court held that the argument “may be considered and 
dealt with without extended discussion, given the acceptance of distinctions 
so clear and simple... as to be dispositive on their face.”133  Citing a long 
line of cases, the court summarily stated that “we do not recognize an 
independent parental right of religious freedom to support the relief 
requested.”134 
The lesson of Quinlan is that parents seeking the right to act on behalf of 
their children should not expect their religious beliefs to grant them 
unlimited liberties to act.  They may gain approval in the end, but must seek 
it from other rationales in conjunction with – or instead of – their faith. 
C. Equal Protection, Criticized 
The argument for Equal Protection analysis is certainly not without its 
critiques.  One criticism comes from Professor David Steinberg.  He 
believes that “attacks on spiritual healing often are overbroad and 
insensitive to legitimate free exercise interest and parental rights.”135  The 
State should only intervene, in his estimation, when “serious physical harm 
or illness” could result from inaction – and even then, the State needs to 
show that medical treatment “offers a fair probability of substantially 
improving the child’s health.”136  Directly addressing Dwyer’s argument, he 
considers it “highly problematic and ultimately unconvincing.”137  His 
criticism is mostly focused on Dwyer’s argument that children deserve 
suspect-class classification.  Steinberg writes that defining the class as 
“children of religious objectors” and not “all spiritual healing practitioners,” 
 
130. Id. at 659.  The court evaluated extensively the amicus brief submitted by the Church and 
specifically limited the decision: “the ‘Catholic view’ of religious neutrality in the circumstances of this 
case is considered by the Court only in the aspect of its impact upon … Joseph Quinlan, and not as a 
precedent in terms of the civil law.”  Id. at 660. 
131. Id. at 653. 
132. The ventilator was, in fact, removed, but Karen still survived for nine more years, finally passing 
away in 1985. See Robert D. McFadden, Karen Ann Quinlan, 31, Dies; Focus of '76 Right to Die Case, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 12, 1985, at A1. 
133. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 661. 
134. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 661–62. 
135. Steinberg, supra note 17, at 181. 
136. Id. at 181–82. 
137. Id. at 203. 
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yet proposing a change that affects the latter, is an unfair technique.138  
Further, he feels that an Equal Protection challenge is unworkable, for it 
distrusts the parents, the State, and even the children themselves, instead 
relying upon a guardian ad litem or a judge to prosecute the act.139  In all, 
Steinberg concludes, “Professor Dwyer’s Equal Protection Clause challenge 
is premised on an antipathy toward spiritual healing.”140 
Dr. Dwyer took some extreme approaches that could theoretically 
undermine his argument.  In an early article, he argued that the Constitution 
guarantees no inherent parental rights whatsoever.141 Taking “a step back” 
from the debates, he “ask[ed] at a fundamental level what it means to say 
that individuals have rights as parents....”142  Dr. Dwyer concluded, “the 
claim that parents should have child-rearing rights... is inconsistent with 
principles deeply embedded in our law and morality.”143  His critique is 
rooted in a theme that permeates his scholarship, the argument that “no 
individual is entitled to control the life of another person, free from outside 
interference, no matter how intimate the relationship between them....”144 
This theme has definite merit, but his conclusion, that parents should 
merely be awarded the “privilege” of raising their children, “limited in its 
scope to actions and decisions not inconsistent with the child’s temporal 
interests,”145 is unorthodox at best.  Such a paradigm shift, no matter where 
grounded, is so shocking as to possibly cast a shadow of skepticism on later 
theories.  Yet a greater context to the article helps belie these possible 
criticisms.  The article was penned in 1994, and appears to have been 
written while Professor Dwyer was in pursuit of a Ph.D.146  In the years 
since, his analyses have become more refined and nuanced, easing the 
effect of early unorthodoxy.  For example, in an article published in 2000 
he again challenged spiritual treatment exemptions, but this time managed 
to keep high respect for the families’ beliefs.147 
 
 
138. Id. at 204–05. 
139. Id. at 206. 
140. Id. at 207. 
141. Dwyer I, supra note 55, at 1379. 
142. Id. at 1373. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. at 1374. 
146. William & Mary Law School, Faculty Biography: James Dwyer, 
http://law.wm.edu/documents/directory/dwyer-648.pdf (last visited October 13, 2010). 
147. See, e.g.,  James G. Dwyer, Spiritual Treatment Exemptions to Child Medial Neglect Laws: What 
We Outsiders Should Think, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 147 (2000) [hereinafter Dwyer III]. 
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Despite these challenges, which are not without merit, an Equal 
Protection challenge to exemptions appears to be a valid approach.  Even 
more than mere validity, this approach is stronger than the traditional 
critiques, which are couched in the Establishment Clause. 
IV. TRADITIONAL CRITIQUE: THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
The loudest and most common criticisms of exemptions are grounded not 
in Equal Protection but instead in the Establishment Clause.  Often 
portrayed as operating in tension with the Free Exercise Clause, the First 
Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion.”148  This phrase has been interpreted numerous 
ways over the years and is commonly understood through the image of a 
“wall of separation” between church and state.149  Although the specific 
meaning of this term is an endless debate, it still serves as a baseline to 
which establishment questions return. 
Evaluating a potential establishment violation is a difficult matter.  One 
enduring test, despite being “much maligned by both scholars and the 
Justices themselves,”150 is the so-called “Lemon Test”  established in Lemon 
v. Kurtzman,151 the test has a three-step analysis: “First, the statute must 
have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect 
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statue 
must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’”152 
As for the first prong, commonly called the “secular purpose” test, “any 
governmental accommodation directed exclusively to the benefit of 
religious actors poses obvious problems....”153  Faith healing exemptions do 
not fail this prong, for “a statute whose purpose was to alleviate significant 
governmental interference with the ability of individual religious actors to 
 
148. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
149. In Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) Justice Black wrote that: 
The “establishment of religion” clause means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal 
Government may set up a church. Neither can pass laws that aid one religion, aid all 
religions, or prefer one religion over another . . . In the words of Jefferson, the clause 
against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect “a wall of separation 
between church and State. 
330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947) (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164)). 
150. Massie, supra note 89, at 748 (citations omitted). 
151. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (forbidding public payment of teachers in private 
schools).  
152. Id. at 612–13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)). 
153. Massie, supra note 89, at 749. 
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[practice their religion] would pass muster.”154  The second prong “presents 
the greatest problems for accommodations aimed exclusively at religious 
actors.”155  Since these exemptions “obviously provide a benefit to religious 
actors that is unavailable to others,” a close look must be taken.156  Just like 
every Establishment question, there is a gray area, as a line of cases 
indicates that “when government policy itself has imposed a burden on 
religiously motivated behavior” it may overrule establishment concerns.157 
The final Lemon prong is concerned with “entanglement,” and “invalidates 
policies requiring a high degree of interaction between government and 
religious institutions or actors.”158  When a statute seems to single out one 
particular sect or religion for benefits, such as recognizing that group with 
specific  and particular language, an entanglement issue may arise.159  As 
such, “it would clearly be unacceptable for a court to delve into the efficacy 
of spiritual healing as a means of meeting a statutory requirement of 
‘adequate medical care.’”160 
The U.S. Supreme Court has not addressed whether or not neglect 
exemptions for religious purposes violate the Establishment Clause.  In 
order to analyze the question outside of academia, it is necessary to look to 
the state courts for precedent and guidance.  In 1984, Ohio’s Court of 
Common Pleas took up a challenge to an exemption brought as a result of 
young Seth Miskimens’ death.161  Fascinatingly, the state itself argued for 
the statute’s unconstitutionality, leaving the Christian Science church as the 
only party to support the statute.162  The court evaluated the statute using 
Lemon and Prince, and agreed with the state, finding unconstitutionality 
under Lemon’s third prong of entanglement: “ [the statute] hopelessly 
involves the state in the determination of questions which should not be the 
subject of governmental inquisition....”163  The state should not, the court 
confirmed, be in the business of determining what is or what is not valid 
belief, for this is the very definition of entanglement under Lemon.164 
 
154. Id. 
155. Id. at 749. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. at 750–51; see, e.g., Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) 
(granting a religiously-based exemption to gender-based anti-discrimination statutes). 
158. Id. at 752. 
159. Id. at 753. 
160. Id. at 754. 
161. State v. Miskimens, 490 N.E.2d 931, 931 (Ohio Com.Pl. 1984). 
162. Id. at 932; see also Monopoli, supra note 11, at 346 n.170. 
163. Miskimens, 490 N.E.2d at 934. 
164. Id. 
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Miskimens was endorsed by the Supreme Court of Delaware in the 1991 
case of Newmark v. Williams.165  In a lengthy footnote, the court gave 
approval to the Miskimens decision, opining that “[t]he reasoning applied in 
Miskimens... is a firmly rooted principle of constitutional law.”166  Any 
decision that would “require this Court to determine, as an initial matter, 
whether a certain religion is worthy of official recognition” was properly 
classified as an entanglement issue.167  Courts across the nation, then, are 
beginning to classify children’s health issues that pertain to religion as 
involving the Establishment Clause in at least some way.  However, just 
because a challenge is increasingly adopted does not make it necessarily the 
optimal approach.  Instead, an approach based on Equal Protection is 
stronger because it does not delve into the world of judging religious beliefs 
and is likely to be more acceptable to the general public. 
V.  WHY EQUAL PROTECTION? 
A. Avoiding the Complexities of First Amendment Jurisprudence. 
When handling an Establishment Clause challenge, the court is required 
to toe the line of inquiring into the veracity of religious beliefs, a line it is 
forbidden to cross.168  The Ohio court explained in Miskimens, “questions 
such as what is a ‘recognized religious body,’ [and] what are its tenets... 
run[] clearly afoul of... the ‘excessive entanglement’ test....”169  Supreme 
Court precedent supports this ban on judging the truth of religion holding 
that the veracity of a belief should not be submitted to a jury or other finder 
of fact, even if “the religious views... seem incredible, if not preposterous, 
to most people.”170  An avoidance of medicine and doctors, especially when 
relating to children, is precisely the sort of belief that should not be 
evaluated by the state or a jury, out of fairness to all parties involved.  After 
all, the parents have a right to the free expression of their religion, a right  
 
 
165. Newark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108, 1113 n.8 (Del. 1991). 
166. Id. 
167. Id. at 1114 n.8. 
168. See Callahan v. Woods, 658 F.2d 679, 685 (9th Cir. 1981) (“In applying the free exercise clause of 
the First Amendment, courts may not inquire into the truth, validity, or reasonableness of a claimant's 
religious beliefs.”). 
169. Miskimens, 490 N.E.2d at 934. 
170. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944). 
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that is not up to majority debate.  Any challenge to a religious exemption 
necessarily entails at least some such determination – or at least the 
appearance of one. 
An Equal Protection challenge, on the other hand, involves no such 
dangerous determination.  Deciding the level of scrutiny is a contentious 
action, and endless debate can revolve around which level a court chooses.  
Despite this potential controversy, the decision still contains none of the 
major constitutional issues of religion.  It avoids the proverbial “third rail” 
and instead focuses on the important issue of children’s lives and not 
eliminating one group’s rights at the whims of another. 
B. Pragmatic Possibilities 
Beyond legalistic and Constitutional concerns, public opinion does 
matter.  Religion is one of the most deeply entrenched issues to most 
Americans – a recent survey found that 56% of citizens classified religion 
as “very important” in their lives.171  Thus, any decision couched in these 
matters is bound to be criticized and analyzed endlessly.  Conceivably, a 
decision striking down a faith healing exemption on Establishment grounds 
would elicit an uproar from religious minorities of all types, even those who 
do not avoid doctors.  Mainstream religious would conceivably react 
similarly, out of a concern for state influence in and over religion. 
An appeal to fairness and even treatment on the grounds of Equal 
Protection is likely to avoid many of these issues, and is likely to be more 
acceptable to the general public.  Certainly, some reaction is to be expected.  
However, society has grappled with these arguments for decades, fighting 
to deal with racial integration and its effects.  If America can handle these 
strong tensions, and become a stronger country as a result, then surely it can 
rise to the occasion of protecting children’s rights. 
C. Protecting Children’s Welfare and Personhood 
If there is any universal theme in American jurisprudence, it is arguably 
that those unable to help themselves are the most important and deserving 
of protection.  After all, how can a nation whose founding document 
purports to “establish Justice [and] promote the general Welfare” stand idly 
 
171. THE PEW FORUM ON RELIGION AND PUBLIC LIFE, U.S. RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE SURVEY: 
SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS 6 (2007), available at http://religions.pewforum.org/pdf/report2religious-
landscape-study-key-findings.pdf. 
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by while children are allowed to suffer and die?172  Despite the continued 
existence of exemptions that preclude any prosecution for child abuse or 
neglect, district attorneys across the nation work to prosecute for deaths 
under alternative statutes, such as criminal mistreatment or manslaughter.  
In one notable instance, largely in response to the deaths associated with the 
Followers of Christ Church,173 the Oregon legislature passed a specific 
measure removing the affirmative defense of faith healing from its second-
degree manslaughter statute.174  These and other efforts demonstrate the 
state’s interest in protecting children, and the persistence of religious 
exemptions clearly undermines this interest.  The exemptions’ political 
survival is a topic and question too broad for this paper,175 but their 
constitutional viability is an entirely different matter. 
The argument for protecting children’s welfare by eliminating 
exemptions is supported by the writings of Prof. Massie.  She writes: 
Given our society’s concern for the welfare of children, and the 
statutory presumption that failure to provide them with certain 
necessaries [sic.] constitutes abuse or neglect, it is 
incomprehensible that the law would permit different definitions 
of abuse or neglect to pertain to different children, depending 
upon their various parents’ religious beliefs and practices.  Such 
an approach is a blatant violation of children’s rights to equal 
protection of the laws.176 
It is a reasonable and logical argument, and under this lens the continuation 
of exemptions is an unjust and unconstitutional premise. 
As for children’s personhood, the Supreme Court is clear: 
“Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only 
when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as 
adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional 
rights.”177  Each person has the right to decide what their personal faith 
shall be, arguably the shining hallmark of the First Amendment’s religion 
clauses.  However, as some commentators have argued, shouldn’t a child be 
 
172. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
173. See supra Part II.B.1. 
174. See 1999 Or. Laws 954, codified at OR. REV. STAT. § 163.125 (1999); see also Laura 
Oppenheimer, Parents Lose Legal Defense For Using Faith Healing; Gov. John Kitzhaber Signs A 
Compromise Bill That Attempts To Guarantee Children The Right To Adequate Medical Care, THE 
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able to live long enough to make the decision?178  If not, how can his or her 
right be adequately expressed?  Yes, children are treated differently than 
adults, and parents have the right to direct their upbringing.  Any other 
conclusion undermines the possibility of a truly diverse and pluralistic 
society.  There must, however, be limits on how much independence a 
family circle may have: after all, a husband may not use religion as an 
excuse for domestic violence, so long as the victim does not publicly 
object.179  At the risk of redundancy, Professor Dwyer’s words still have 
strong relevance and resonance: “no individual is entitled to control the life 
of another person, free from outside interference, no matter how intimate 
the relationship between them.”180 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The crucial distinction to be drawn while analyzing parental rights is 
between lifestyle and life.  Parents, churches, schools, and the community 
have an important role in shaping a child’s lifestyle.  It is precisely these 
influences that determine why one child plays baseball while another plays 
the trombone, or why one goes to a synagogue while another goes to a 
cathedral.  These influences also determine, to a large part, whether a child 
goes to college or ends up in jail.  But nowhere are these social and familial 
forces given the ability to determine whether a child has a life or not.  This 
line is crucial.  It is fundamental.  And it must be protected, even at the risk 
of offending a parent’s religious choices. 
Though they may also violate the Establishment Clause, religious 
exemptions to child neglect statutes are an unconstitutional violation of 
children’s right to equal protection under the law.  Challenging them as 
such is a potentially more effective and pragmatic endeavor than an attack 
grounded in the First Amendment.  A long line of cases has established that 
parents may not use religion as an excuse for neglect; the state, meanwhile, 
may not use the type of family a child was born into as grounds for different  
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treatment.  By removing these exemptions, children are protected while 
being respected as full people under the Constitution.  Children are dying 
needlessly every year, and it is time to re-frame the debate, look through the 
lens of Equal Protection, and do what is right. 
 
